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Abstract 
 
We investigate the darknet ￿ a collection of networks and technologies 
used to share digital content.  The darknet is not a separate physical 
network but an application and protocol layer riding on existing 
networks.  Examples of darknets are peer-to-peer file sharing, CD and 
DVD copying, and key or password sharing on email and newsgroups.  
The last few years have seen vast increases in the darknet￿s 
aggregate bandwidth, reliability, usability, size of shared library, and 
availability of search engines.  In this paper we categorize and analyze 
existing and future darknets, from both the technical and legal 
perspectives.  We speculate that there will be short-term impediments 
to the effectiveness of the darknet as a distribution mechanism, but 
ultimately the darknet-genie will not be put back into the bottle.  In view 
of this hypothesis, we examine the relevance of content protection and 
content distribution architectures.  
 
1 Introduction 
People have always copied things. In the past, most items of value were physical 
objects.  Patent law and economies of scale meant that small scale copying of physical 
objects was usually uneconomic, and large-scale copying (if it infringed) was stoppable 
using policemen and courts.  Today, things of value are increasingly less tangible: often 
they are just bits and bytes or can be accurately represented as bits and bytes.  The 
widespread deployment of packet-switched networks and the huge advances in computers 
and codec-technologies has made it feasible (and indeed attractive) to deliver such digital 
works over the Internet.  This presents great opportunities and great challenges.  The 
opportunity is low-cost delivery of personalized, desirable high-quality content.  The 
challenge is that such content can be distributed illegally.  Copyright law governs the 
legality of copying and distribution of such valuable data, but copyright protection is 
increasingly strained in a world of programmable computers and high-speed networks. 
For example, consider the staggering burst of creativity by authors of computer 
programs that are designed to share audio files.  This was first popularized by Napster, but 
today several popular applications and services offer similar capabilities.  CD-writers have 
become mainstream, and DVD-writers may well follow suit.  Hence, even in the absence 
of network connectivity, the opportunity for low-cost, large-scale file sharing exists. 
  
1.1 The Darknet 
Throughout this paper, we will call the shared items (e.g. software programs, songs, 
movies, books, etc.) objects. The persons who copy objects will be called users of the 
darknet, and the computers used to share objects will be called hosts. 
                                                  
1 Statements in this paper represent the opinions of the authors and not necessarily the 
position of Microsoft Corporation. The idea of the darknet is based upon three assumptions: 
1.  Any widely distributed object will be available to a fraction of users in a form 
that permits copying. 
2.  Users will copy objects if it is possible and interesting to do so. 
3.  Users are connected by high-bandwidth channels. 
 
The  darknet  is the distribution network that emerges from the injection of objects 
according to assumption 1 and the distribution of those objects according to assumptions 
2 and 3.  
One implication of the first assumption is that any content protection system will leak 
popular or interesting content into the darknet, because some fraction of users--possibly 
experts￿will overcome any copy prevention mechanism or because the object will enter 
the darknet before copy protection occurs.  
The term ￿widely distributed￿ is intended to capture the notion of mass market 
distribution of objects to thousands or millions of practically anonymous users. This is in 
contrast to the protection of military, industrial, or personal secrets, which are typically not 
widely distributed and are not the focus of this paper. 
Like other networks, the darknet can be modeled as a directed graph with labeled 
edges. The graph has one vertex for each user/host. For any pair of vertices (u,v), there is 
a directed edge from u to v if objects can be copied from u to v. The edge labels can be 
used to model relevant information about the physical network and may include 
information such as bandwidth, delay, availability, etc.  The vertices are characterized by 
their object library, object requests made to other vertices, and object requests satisfied. 
To operate effectively, the darknet has a small number of technological and 
infrastructure requirements, which are similar to those of legal content distribution 
networks. These infrastructure requirements are: 
1.  facilities for injecting new objects into the darknet (input) 
2.  a distribution network that carries copies of objects to users (transmission) 
3.  ubiquitous rendering devices, which allow users to consume objects (output) 
4.  a search mechanism to enable users to find objects (database) 
5.  storage that allows the darknet to retain objects for extended periods of time. 
Functionally, this is mostly a caching mechanism that reduces the load and 
exposure of nodes that inject objects. 
 
The dramatic rise in the efficiency of the darknet can be traced back to the general 
technological improvements in these infrastructure areas. At the same time, most attempts 
to fight the darknet can be viewed as efforts to deprive it of one or more of the 
infrastructure items. Legal action has traditionally targeted search engines and, to a lesser 
extent, the distribution network. As we will describe later in the paper, this has been 
partially successful.  The drive for legislation on mandatory watermarking aims to deprive 
the darknet of rendering devices. We will argue that watermarking approaches are 
technically flawed and unlikely to have any material impact on the darknet. Finally, most 
content protection systems are meant to prevent or delay the injection of new objects into 
the darknet. Based on our first assumption, no such system constitutes an impenetrable 
barrier, and we will discuss the merits of some popular systems. 
    We see no technical impediments to the darknet becoming increasingly efficient 
(measured by aggregate library size and available bandwidth).  However, the darknet, in 
all its transport-layer embodiments, is under legal attack. In this paper, we speculate on 
the technical and legal future of the darknet, concentrating particularly, but not exclusively, 
on peer-to-peer networks. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyzes different 
manifestations of the darknet with respect to their robustness to attacks on the 
infrastructure requirements described above and speculates on the future development of 
the darknet.  Section 3 describes content protection mechanisms, their probable effect on 
the darknet, and the impact of the darknet upon them. In sections 4 and 5, we speculate 
on the scenarios in which the darknet will be effective, and how businesses may need to 
behave to compete effectively with it. 
 
2 The Evolution of the Darknet 
We classify the different manifestations of the darknet that have come into existence 
in recent years with respect to the five infrastructure requirements described and analyze 
weaknesses and points of attack. 
As a system, the darknet is subject to a variety of attacks. Legal action continues to 
be the most powerful challenge to the darknet. However, the darknet is also subject to a 
variety of other common threats (e.g. viruses, spamming) that, in the past, have lead to 
minor disruptions of the darknet, but could be considerably more damaging. 
In this section we consider the potential impact of legal developments on the darknet. 
Most of our analysis focuses on system robustness, rather than on detailed legal 
questions. We regard legal questions only with respect to their possible effect: the failure 
of certain nodes or links (vertices and edges of the graph defined above). In this sense, we 
are investigating a well known problem in distributed systems. 
 
2.1 Early Small-Worlds Networks 
Prior to the mid 1990s, copying was organized around groups of friends and 
acquaintances.  The copied objects were music on cassette tapes and computer 
programs. The rendering devices were widely-available tape players and the computers of 
the time ￿ see Fig. 1. Content injection was trivial, since most objects were either not copy 
protected or, if they were equipped with copy protection mechanisms, the mechanisms 
were easily defeated. The distribution network was a ￿sneaker net￿ of floppy disks and 
tapes (storage), which were handed in person between members of a group or were sent 
by postal mail. The bandwidth of this network ￿ albeit small by today￿s standards ￿ was 
sufficient for the objects of the time. The main limitation of the sneaker net with its 
mechanical transport layer was latency. It could take days or weeks to obtain a copy of an 
object. Another serious limitation of these networks was the lack of a sophisticated search 
engine. 
There were limited attempts to prosecute individuals who were trying to sell 
copyrighted objects they had obtained from the darknet (commercial piracy). However, the 
darknet as a whole was never under significant legal threat. Reasons may have included 
its limited commercial impact and the protection from legal surveillance afforded by 
sharing amongst friends. 
The sizes of object libraries available on such networks are strongly influenced by the 
interconnections between the networks.  For example, schoolchildren may copy content 
from their ￿family network￿ to their ￿school network￿ and thereby increase the size of the 
darknet object library available to each.  Such networks have been studied extensively and 
are classified as ￿interconnected small-worlds networks.￿ [24] There are several popular 
examples of the characteristics of such systems. For example, most people have a social 
group of a few score of people.  Each of these people has a group of friends that partly 
overlap with their friends￿ friends, and also introduces more people.  It is estimated that, on average, each person is connected to every other person in the world by a chain of about 
six people from which arises the term ￿six degrees of separation￿. 
These findings are remarkably broadly applicable (e.g. [20][20,[3]3]).  The chains are 
on average so short because certain super-peers have many links.  In our example, some 
people are gregarious and have lots of friends from different social or geographical 
circles..   
We suspect that these findings have implications for sharing on darknets, and we will 
return to this point when we discuss the darknets of the future later in this paper. 
The small-worlds darknet continues to exist. However, a number of technological 
advances have given rise to new forms of the darknet that have superseded the small-
worlds for some object types (e.g. audio).   
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Figure 1: Historical evolution of the Darknet.  We highlight the location of the search engine (if present) and the effective bandwidth (thicker lines represent
higher bandwidth).  Network latencies are not shown, but are much longer for the sneakernet than for the IP-based networks.  
 
2.2 Central Internet Servers 
By 1998, a new form of the darknet began to emerge from technological advances in 
several areas. The internet had become mainstream, and as such its protocols and 
infrastructure could now be relied upon by anyone seeking to connect users with a 
centralized service or with each other. The continuing fall in the price of storage together 
with advances in compression technology had also crossed the threshold at which storing 
large numbers of audio files was no longer an obstacle to mainstream users. Additionally, 
the power of computers had crossed the point at which they could be used as rendering 
devices for multimedia content. Finally, ￿CD ripping￿ became a trivial method for content 
injection. The first embodiments of this new darknet were central internet servers with large 
collections of MP3 audio files. A fundamental change that came with these servers was 
the use of a new distribution network: The internet displaced the sneaker net ￿ at least for 
audio content. This solved several problems of the old darknet.  First, latency was reduced 
drastically.  
Secondly, and more importantly, discovery of objects became much easier because 
of simple and powerful search mechanisms ￿ most importantly the general-purpose world-
wide-web search engine. The local view of the small world was replaced by a global view 
of the entire collection accessible by all users. The main characteristic of this form of the 
darknet was centralized storage and search ￿ a simple architecture that mirrored 
mainstream internet servers. 
Centralized or quasi-centralized distribution and service networks make sense for 
legal online commerce.  Bandwidth and infrastructure costs tend to be low, and having 
customers visit a commerce site means the merchant can display adverts, collect profiles, 
and bill efficiently.  Additionally, management, auditing, and accountability are much easier 
in a centralized model.    
However, centralized schemes work poorly for illegal  object distribution because 
large, central servers are large single points of failure: If the distributor is breaking the law, 
it is relatively easy to force him to stop.  Early MP3 Web and FTP sites were commonly 
￿hosted￿ by universities, corporations, and ISPs.  Copyright-holders or their 
representatives sent ￿cease and desist￿ letters to these web-site operators and web-
owners citing copyright infringement and in a few cases followed up with legal action [15].  
The threats of legal action were successful attacks on those centralized networks, and 
MP3 web and FTP sites disappeared from the mainstream shortly after they appeared.  
 
2.3 Peer-to-Peer Networks 
The realization that centralized networks are not robust to attack (be it legal or 
technical) has spurred much of the innovation in peer-to-peer networking and file sharing 
technologies. In this section, we examine architectures that have evolved. Early systems 
were flawed because critical components remained centralized (Napster) or because of 
inefficiencies and lack of scalability of the protocol (gnutella) [17]. It should be noted that 
the problem of object location in a massively distributed, rapidly changing, heterogeneous 
system was new at the time peer-to-peer systems emerged. Efficient and highly scalable 
protocols have been proposed since then [9][9,[23]23]. 
 
2.3.1. Napster 
Napster was the service that ignited peer-to-peer file sharing in 1999 [14]. There 
should be little doubt that a major portion of the massive (for the time) traffic on Napster 
was of copyrighted objects being transferred in a peer-to-peer model in violation of 
copyright law. Napster succeeded where central servers had failed by relying on the 
distributed storage of objects not under the control of Napster. This moved the injection, 
storage, network distribution, and consumption of objects to users.  
However, Napster retained a centralized database
2 with a searchable index on the file 
name. The centralized database itself became a legal target [15].  Napster was first 
enjoined to deny certain queries (e.g. ￿Metallica￿) and then to police its network for all 
copyrighted content.  As the size of the darknet indexed by Napster shrank, so did the 
number of users.  This illustrates a general characteristic of darknets: there is positive 
                                                  
2 Napster used a farm of weakly coupled databases with clients attaching to just one of the 
server hosts.   feedback between the size of the object library and aggregate bandwidth and the appeal 
of the network for its users. 
 
2.3.2. Gnutella 
The next technology that sparked public interest in peer-to-peer file sharing was 
Gnutella. In addition to distributed object storage, Gnutella uses a fully distributed 
database described more fully in [13]. Gnutella does not rely upon any centralized server 
or service ￿ a peer just needs the IP address of one or a few participating peers to (in 
principle) reach any host on the Gnutella darknet.  Second, Gnutella is not really ￿run￿ by 
anyone: it is an open protocol and anyone can write a Gnutella client application. Finally, 
Gnutella and its descendants go beyond sharing audio and have substantial non-infringing 
uses. This changes its legal standing markedly and puts it in a similar category to email. 
That is, email has substantial non-infringing use, and so email itself is not under legal 
threat even though it may be used to transfer copyrighted material unlawfully. 
 
2.4 Robustness of Fully Distributed Darknets 
Fully distributed peer-to-peer systems do not present the single points of failure that 
led to the demise of central MP3 servers and Napster. It is natural to ask how robust these 
systems are and what form potential attacks could take. We observe the following 
weaknesses in Gnutella-like systems: 
•  Free riding 
•  Lack of anonymity 
 
2.4.1 Free Riding 
Peer-to-peer systems are often thought of as fully decentralized networks with copies 
of objects uniformly distributed among the hosts. While this is possible in principle, in 
practice, it is not the case. Recent measurements of libraries shared by gnutella peers 
indicate that the majority of content is provided by a tiny fraction of the hosts [1].  In effect, 
although gnutella appears to be a peer-to-peer network of cooperating hosts, in actual fact 
it has evolved to effectively be another largely centralized system ￿ see Fig. 2. Free riding 
(i.e. downloading objects without sharing them) by many gnutella users appears to be 
main cause of this development. Widespread free riding removes much of the power of 
network dynamics and may reduce a peer-to-peer network into a simple unidirectional 
distribution system from a small number of sources to a large number of destinations. Of 
course, if this is the case, then the vulnerabilities that we observed in centralized systems 
(e.g. FTP-servers) are present again. Free riding and the emergence of super-peers have 
several causes: 
Peer-to-peer file sharing assumes that a significant fraction of users adhere to the 
somewhat post-capitalist idea of sacrificing their own resources for the ￿common good￿ of 
the network. Most free-riders do not seem to adopt this idea. For example, with 56 kbps 
modems still being the network connection for most users, allowing uploads constitutes a 
tangible bandwidth sacrifice. One approach is to make collaboration mandatory. For 
example, Freenet [6] clients are required to contribute some disk space. However, 
enforcing such requirements without a central infrastructure is difficult. 
Existing infrastructure is another reason for the existence of super-peers. There are 
vast differences in the resources available to different types of hosts. For example, a T3 
connection provides the combined bandwidth of about one thousand 56 kbps telephone 
connections. 
 2.4.2 Lack of Anonymity 
Users of gnutella who share objects they have stored are not anonymous. Current 
peer-to-peer networks permit the server endpoints to be determined, and if a peer-client 
can determine the IP address and affiliation of a peer, then so can a lawyer or government 
agency. This means that users who share copyrighted objects face some threat of legal 
action. This appears to be yet another explanation for free riding. 
There are some possible technological workarounds to the absence of endpoint 
anonymity.  We could imagine anonymizing routers, overseas routers, object 
fragmentation, or some other means to complicate the effort required by law-enforcement 
to determine the original source of the copyrighted bits. For example, Freenet tries to hide 
the identity of the hosts storing any given object by means of a variety of heuristics, 
including routing the object through intermediate hosts and providing mechanisms for easy 
migration of objects to other hosts. Similarly, Mnemosyne [10] tries to organize object 
storage, such that individual hosts may not know what objects are stored on them. It is 
conjectured in [10] that this may amount to common-carrier status for the host. A detailed 
analysis of the legal or technical robustness of these systems is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 
2.4.3 Attacks 
In light of these weaknesses, attacks on gnutella-style darknets focus on their object 
storage and search infrastructures. Because of the prevalence of super-peers, the gnutella 
darknet depends on a relatively small set of powerful hosts, and these hosts are promising 
targets for attackers.  
Darknet hosts owned by corporations are typically easily removed. Often, these hosts 
are set up by individual employees without the knowledge of corporate management. 
Generally corporations respect intellectual property laws. This together with their 
reluctance to become targets of lawsuits, and their centralized network of hierarchical 
management makes it relatively easy to remove darknet hosts in the corporate domain.  
While the structures at universities are typically less hierarchical and strict than those 
of corporations, ultimately, similar rules apply. If the .com and .edu T1 and T3 lines were 
pulled from under a darknet, the usefulness of the network would suffer drastically. 
This would leave DSL, ISDN, and cable-modem users as the high-bandwidth servers 
of objects. We believe limiting hosts to this class would present a far less effective piracy 
network today from the perspective of acquisition because of the relative rarity of high-
bandwidth consumer connections, and hence users would abandon this darknet.   
However, consumer broadband is becoming more popular, so in the long run it is probable 
that there will be adequate consumer bandwidth to support an effective consumer darknet. 
The obvious next legal escalation is to bring direct or indirect (through the affiliation) 
challenges against users who share large libraries of copyrighted material.  This is already 
happening and the legal threats or actions appear to be successful [7]. This requires the 
collaboration of ISPs in identifying their customers, which appears to be forthcoming due 
to requirements that the carrier must take to avoid liability
3 and, in some cases, because of 
corporate ties between ISPs and content providers. Once again, free riding makes this 
attack strategy far more tractable. 
It is hard to predict further legal escalation, but we note that the DMCA (digital 
millennium copyright act) is a far-reaching (although not fully tested) example of a law that 
                                                  
3 The Church of Scientology has been aggressive in pursuing ISPs that host its copyright 
material on newsgroups.  The suit that appeared most likely to result in a clear finding, filed 
against Netcom, was settled out of court. Hence it is still not clear whether an ISP has a 
responsibility to police the users of its network. is potentially quite powerful.  We believe it probable that there will be a few more rounds of 
technical innovations to sidestep existing laws, followed by new laws, or new 
interpretations of old laws, in the next few years. 
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2.4.4 Conclusions 
All attacks we have identified exploit the lack of endpoint anonymity and are aided by 
the effects of free riding. We have seen effective legal measures on all peer-to-peer 
technologies that are used to provide effectively global access to copyrighted material. 
Centralized web servers were effectively closed down. Napster was effectively closed 
down. Gnutella and Kazaa are under threat because of free rider weaknesses and lack of 
endpoint anonymity. 
Lack of endpoint anonymity is a direct result of the globally accessible global object 
database, and it is the existence of the global database that most distinguishes the newer 
darknets from the earlier small worlds. At this point, it is hard to judge whether the darknet 
will be able to retain this global database in the long term, but it seems seems clear that 
legal setbacks to global-index peer-to-peer will continue to be severe.    
However, should Gnutella-style systems become unviable as darknets, systems, such 
as Freenet or Mnemosyne might take their place. Peer-to-peer networking and file sharing 
does seem to be entering into the mainstream ￿ both for illegal and legal uses.  If we 
couple this with the rapid build-out of consumer broadband, the dropping price of storage, 
and the fact that personal computers are effectively establishing themselves as centers of 
home-entertainment, we suspect that peer-to-peer functionality will remain popular and 
become more widespread. 
 Figure 3: Interconnected small-worlds darknets.  Threats of surveillance close global darknets.  Darknets form around social groups, but use high
bandwidth, low latency communications (the internet) and are supported by search engines.  Custom applications, Instant-Messenger-style applic
or simple shared file-systems host the darknet.  People￿s social groups overlap so objects available in one darknet diffuse to others: in the termino
used in this paper, each peer that is a member of more than one darknet is an introduction host for objects obtained from other darknets.  
 
2.5 Small Worlds Networks Revisited 
In this section we try to predict the evolution of the darknet should global peer-to-peer 
networks be effectively stopped by legal means. The globally accessible global database 
is the only infrastructure component of the darknet that can be disabled in this way. The 
other enabling technologies of the darknet (injection, distribution networks, rendering 
devices, storage) will not only remain available, but rapidly increase in power, based on 
general technological advances and the possible incorporation of cryptography. We stress 
that the networks described in this section (in most cases) provide poorer services than 
global network, and would only arise in the absence of a global database. 
In the absence of a global database, small-worlds networks could again become the 
prevalent form of the darknet. However, these small-worlds will be more powerful than 
they were in the past. With the widespread availability of cheap CD and DVD readers and 
writers as well as large hard disks, the bandwidth of the sneaker net has increased 
dramatically, the cost of object storage has become negligible and object injection tools 
have become ubiquitous. Furthermore, the internet is available as a distribution 
mechanism that is adequate for audio for most users, and is becoming increasingly 
adequate for video and computer programs. In light of strong cryptography, it is hard to 
imagine how sharing could be observed and prosecuted as long as users do not share 
with strangers.  
In concrete terms, students in dorms will establish darknets to share content in their 
social group. These darknets may be based on simple file sharing, DVD-copying, or may 
use special application programs or servers: for example, a chat or instant-messenger 
client enhanced to share content with members of your buddy-list.  Each student will be a 
member of other darknets: for example, their family, various special interest groups, 
friends from high-school, and colleagues in part-time jobs (Fig. 3).  If there are a few active 
super-peers - users that locate and share objects with zeal - then we can anticipate that 
content will rapidly diffuse between darknets, and relatively small darknets arranged 
around social groups will approach the aggregate libraries that are provided by the global 
darknets of today. Since the legal exposure of such sharing is quite limited, we believe that 
sharing amongst socially oriented groups will increase unabated. 
Small-worlds networks suffer somewhat from the lack of a global database; each user 
can only see the objects stored by his small world neighbors. This raises a number of 
interesting questions about the network structure and object flow: •  What graph structure will the network have? For example, will it be connected? 
What will be the average distance between two nodes? 
•  Given a graph structure, how will objects propagate through the graph? In 
particular, what fraction of objects will be available at a given node? How long 
does it take for objects to propagate (diffuse) through the network? 
  
Questions of this type have been studied in different contexts in a variety of fields 
(mathematics, computer science, economics, and physics). A number of empirical studies 
seek to establish structural properties of different types of small world networks, such as 
social networks [20] and the world-wide web [3]. These works conclude that the diameter 
of the examined networks is small, and observe further structural properties, such as a 
power law of the degree distribution [5], A number of authors seek to model these 
networks by means of random graphs, in order to perform more detailed mathematical 
analysis on the models [2][2,[8]8,[21]21,[22]22] and, in particular, study the possibility of 
efficient search under different random graph distributions [18][18,[19]19]. We will present 
a quantitative study of the structure and dynamics of small-worlds networks in an 
upcoming paper, but to summarize, small-worlds darknets can be extremely efficient for 
popular titles: very few peers are needed to satisfy requests for top-20 books, songs, 
movies or computer programs.  If darknets are interconnected, we expect the effective 
introduction rate to be large.   Finally, if darknet clients are enhanced to actively seek out 
new popular content, as opposed to the user-demand based schemes of today, small-
worlds darknets will be very efficient. 
 
3 Introducing Content into the Darknet 
Our analysis and intuition have led us to believe that efficient darknets ￿ in global or 
small-worlds form -- will remain a fact of life.  In this section we examine rights-
management technologies that are being deployed to limit the introduction rate or 
decrease the rate of diffusion of content into the darknet. 
 
3.1 Conditional Access Systems 
A conditional-access system is a simple form of rights-management system in which 
subscribers are given access to objects based (typically) on a service contract.  Digital 
rights management systems often perform the same function, but typically impose 
restrictions on the use of objects after unlocking. 
Conditional access systems such as cable, satellite TV, and satellite radio offer little 
or no protection against objects being introduced into the darknet from subscribing hosts.  
A conditional-access system customer has no access to channels or titles to which they 
are not entitled, and has essentially free use of channels that he has subscribed or paid 
for. This means that an investment of ~$100 (at time of writing) on an analog video-
capture card is sufficient to obtain and share TV programs and movies.  Some CA 
systems provide post-unlock protections but they are generally cheap and easy to 
circumvent.  
Thus, conditional access systems provide a widely deployed, high-bandwidth source 
of video material for the darknet.  In practice, the large size and low cost of CA-provided 
video content will limit the exploitation of the darknet for distributing video in the near-term.   
The same can not be said of the use of the darknet to distribute conditional-access 
system broadcast keys.  At some level, each head-end (satellite or cable TV head-end) 
uses an encryption key that must be made available to each customer (it is a broadcast), and in the case of a satellite system this could be millions of homes.  CA-system providers 
take measures to limit the usefulness of exploited session keys (for example, they are 
changed every few seconds), but if darknet latencies are low, or if encrypted broadcast 
data is cached, then the darknet could threaten CA-system revenues. 
We observe that the exposure of the conditional access provider to losses due to 
piracy is proportional to the number of customers that share a session key.  In this regard, 
cable-operators are in a safer position than satellite operators because a cable operator 
can narrowcast more cheaply. 
 
 3.2 DRM Systems 
A classical-DRM system is one in which a client obtains content in protected (typically 
encrypted) form, with a license that specifies the uses to which the content may be put.  
Examples of licensing terms that are being explored by the industry are ￿play on these 
three hosts,￿ ￿play once,￿ ￿use computer program for one hour,￿ etc. 
The license and the wrapped content are presented to the DRM system whose 
responsibility is to ensure that: 
a)  The client cannot remove the encryption from the file and send it to a peer, 
b)  The client cannot ￿clone￿ its DRM system to make it run on another host, 
c)  The client obeys the rules set out in the DRM license, and, 
d)  The client cannot separate the rules from the payload. 
Advanced DRM systems may go further. 
Some such technologies have been commercially very successful ￿ the content 
scrambling system used in DVDs, and (broadly interpreted) the protection schemes used 
by conditional access system providers fall into this category, as do newer DRM systems 
that use the internet as a distribution channel and computers as rendering devices.  These 
technologies are appealing because they promote the establishment of new businesses, 
and can reduce distribution costs.  If costs and licensing terms are appealing to producers 
and consumers, then the vendor thrives.  If the licensing terms are unappealing or 
inconvenient, the costs are too high, or competing systems exist, then the business will 
fail.  The DivX ￿DVD￿ rental model failed on most or all of these metrics, but CSS-
protected DVDs succeeded beyond the wildest expectations of the industry. 
On personal computers, current DRM systems are software-only systems using a 
variety of tricks to make them hard to subvert. DRM enabled consumer electronics devices 
are also beginning to emerge. 
    In the absence of the darknet, the goal of such systems is to have comparable 
security to competing distribution systems ￿ notably the CD and DVD ￿ so that 
programmable computers can play an increasing role in home entertainment.  We will 
speculate whether these strategies will be successful in the Sect. 5. 
DRM systems strive to be BOBE (break-once, break everywhere)-resistant.  That is, 
suppliers anticipate (and the assumptions of the darknet predict) that individual instances 
(clients) of all security-systems, whether based on hardware or software, will be subverted.  
If a client of a system is subverted, then all content protected by that DRM client can be 
unprotected.  If the break can be applied to any other DRM client of that class so that all of 
those users can break their systems, then the DRM-scheme is BOBE-weak.  If, on the 
other hand, knowledge gained breaking one client cannot be applied elsewhere, then the 
DRM system is BOBE-strong. 
Most commercial DRM-systems have BOBE-exploits, and we note that the darknet 
applies to DRM-hacks as well.  The CSS system is an exemplary BOBE-weak system. 
The knowledge and code that comprised the De-CSS exploit spread uncontrolled around the world on web-sites, newsgroups, and even T-shirts, in spite of the fact that, in 
principle, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act makes it a crime to develop these exploits.  
A final characteristic of existing DRM-systems is renewability.  Vendors recognize the 
possibility of exploits, and build systems that can be field-updated. 
It is hard to quantify the effectiveness of DRM-systems for restricting the introduction 
of content into the darknet from experience with existing systems.  Existing DRM-systems 
typically provide protection for months to years; however, the content available to such 
systems has to date been of minimal interest, and the content that is protected is also 
available in unprotected form. The one system that was protecting valuable content (DVD 
video) was broken very soon after compression technology and increased storage 
capacities and bandwidth enabled the darknet to carry video content.  
 
3.3 Software 
The DRM-systems described above can be used to provide protection for software, in 
addition other objects (e.g. audio and video).  Alternatively, copy protection systems for 
computer programs may embed the copy protection code in the software itself. 
The most important copy-protection primitive for computer programs is for the 
software to be bound to a host in such a way that the program will not work on an 
unlicensed machine.  Binding requires a machine ID: this can be a unique number on a 
machine (e.g. a network card MAC address), or can be provided by an external dongle. 
For such schemes to be strong, two things must be true.  First, the machine ID must 
not be ￿virtualizable.￿  For instance, if it is trivial to modify a NIC driver to return an invalid 
MAC address, then the software-host binding is easily broken.  Second, the code that 
performs the binding checks must not be easy to patch.  A variety of technologies that 
revolve around software tamper-resistance can help here [4]. 
We believe that binding software to a host is a more tractable problem than protecting 
passive content, as the former only requires tamper resistance, while the latter also 
requires the ability to hide and manage secrets. However, we observe that all software 
copy-protection systems deployed thus far have bee broken. The definitions of BOBE-
strong and BOBE-weak apply similarly to software. Furthermore, software is as much 
subject to the dynamics of the darknet as passive content. 
 
4 Policing Hosts 
If there are subverted hosts, then content will leak into the darknet.  If the darknet is 
efficient, then content will be rapidly propagated to all interested peers.  In the light of this, 
technologists are looking for alternative protection schemes.  In this section we will 
evaluate watermarking and fingerprinting technologies. 
 
4.1 Watermarking 
Watermarking embeds an ￿indelible￿ invisible mark in content.  A plethora of schemes 
exist for audio/video and still image content and computer programs.   
There are a variety of schemes for exploiting watermarks for content-protection.   
Consider a rendering device that locates and interprets watermarks.  If a watermark is 
found then special action is taken.  Two common actions are: 
1)  Restrict behavior:  For example, a bus-adapter may refuse to pass content that 
has the ￿copy once￿ and ￿already copied once￿ bits set. 2)  Require a license to play:  For example, if a watermark is found indicating that 
content is rights-restricted then the renderer may demand a license indicating 
that the user is authorized to play the content. 
 
Such systems were proposed for audio content ￿ for example the secure digital music 
initiative (SDMI) [16], and are under consideration for video by the copy-protection 
technical working group (CPTWG) [12]. 
There are several reasons why it appears unlikely that such systems will ever become 
an effective anti-piracy technology.  From a commercial point of view, building a 
watermark detector into a device renders it strictly less useful for consumers than a 
competing product that does not. This argues that watermarking schemes are unlikely to 
be widely deployed, unless mandated by legislation. The recently proposed Hollings bill is 
a step along these lines [11]. 
We contrast watermark-based policing with classical DRM:  If a general-purpose 
device is equipped with a classical DRM-system, it can play all content acquired from the 
darknet, and have access to new content acquired through the DRM-channel.  This is in 
stark distinction to reduction of functionality inherent in watermark-based policing. 
Even if watermarking systems were mandated, this approach is likely to fail due to a 
variety of technical inadequacies. The first inadequacy concerns the robustness of the 
embedding layer. We are not aware of systems for which simple data transformations 
cannot strip the mark or make it unreadable.  Marks can be made more robust, but in 
order to recover marks after adversarial manipulation, the reader must typically search a 
large phase space, and this quickly becomes untenable. In spite of the proliferation of 
proposed watermarking schemes, it remains doubtful whether robust embedding layers for 
the relevant content types can be found. 
A second inadequacy lies in unrealistic assumptions about key management. Most 
watermarking schemes require widely deployed cryptographic keys. Standard 
watermarking schemes are based on the normal cryptographic principles of a public 
algorithm and secret keys. Most schemes use a shared-key between marker and detector. 
In practice, this means that all detectors need a private key, and, typically, share a single 
private key.  It would be na￿ve to assume that these keys will remain secret for long in an 
adversarial environment.  Once the key or keys are compromised, the darknet will 
propagate them efficiently, and the scheme collapses. There have been proposals for 
public-key watermarking systems. However, so far, this work does not seem practical and 
the corresponding schemes do not even begin to approach the robustness of the 
cryptographic systems whose name they borrow. 
A final consideration bears on the location of mandatory watermark detectors in client 
devices. On open computing devices (e.g. personal computers), these detectors could, in 
principle, be placed in software or in hardware. Placing detectors in software would be 
largely meaningless, as circumvention of the detector would be as simple as replacing it 
by a different piece of software. This includes detectors placed in the operating system, all 
of whose components can be easily replaced, modified and propagated over the darknet. 
Alternatively, the detectors could be placed in hardware (e.g. audio and video cards). 
In the presence of the problems described this would lead to untenable renewability 
problems --- the hardware would be ineffective within days of deployment. Consumers, on 
the other hand, expect the hardware to remain in use for many years.  Finally, consumers 
themselves are likely to rebel against ￿footing the bill￿ for these ineffective content 
protection systems.  It is virtually certain, that the darknet would be filled with a continuous 
supply of watermark removal tools, based on compromised keys and weaknesses in the 
embedding layer. Attempts to force the public to ￿update￿ their hardware would not only be 
intrusive, but impractical. In summary, attempts to mandate content protection systems based on watermark 
detection at the consumer￿s machine suffer from commercial drawbacks and severe 
technical deficiencies. These schemes, which aim to provide content protection beyond 
DRM by attacking the darknet, are rendered entirely ineffective by the presence of even a 
moderately functional darknet. 
 
4.2 Fingerprinting 
Fingerprint schemes are based on similar technologies and concepts to watermarking 
schemes.  However, whereas watermarking is designed to perform a-priori policing, 
fingerprinting is designed to provide a-posteriori forensics.   
In the simplest case, fingerprinting is used for individual-sale content (as opposed to 
super-distribution or broadcast ￿ although it can be applied there with some additional 
assumptions).  When a client purchases an object, the supplier marks it with an 
individualized mark that identifies the purchaser.  The purchaser is free to use the content, 
but if it appears on a darknet, a policeman can identify the source of the content and the 
offender can be prosecuted. 
Fingerprinting suffers from fewer technical problems than watermarking.  The main 
advantage is that no widespread key-distribution is needed ￿ a publisher can use 
whatever secret or proprietary fingerprinting technology they choose, and is entirely 
responsible for the management of their own keys. 
Fingerprinting has one problem that is not found in watermarking.  Since each 
fingerprinted copy of a piece of media is different, if a user can obtain several different 
copies, he can launch collusion attacks (e.g. averaging).  In general, such attacks are very 
damaging to the fingerprint payload.  
It remains to be seen whether fingerprinting will act as a deterrent to theft.  There is 
currently no legal precedent for media fingerprints being evidence of crime, and this case 
will probably be hard to make ￿ after all, detection is a statistical process with false 
positives, and plenty of opportunity for deniability.  However, we anticipate that there will 
be uneasiness in sharing a piece of content that may contain a person￿s identity, and that 
ultimately leaves that person￿s control.   
Note also that with widely distributed watermarking detectors, it is easy to see 
whether you have successfully removed a watermark.  There is no such assurance for 
determining whether a fingerprint has been successfully removed from an object because 
users are not necessarily knowledgeable about the fingerprint scheme or schemes in use.  
However, if it turns out that the deterrence of fingerprinting is small (i.e. everyone shares 
their media regardless of the presence of marks), there is probably no reasonable legal 
response.  Finally, distribution schemes in which objects must be individualized will be 
expensive. 
 
5 Conclusions 
There seem to be no technical impediments to darknet-based peer-to-peer file sharing 
technologies growing in convenience, aggregate bandwidth and efficiency.  The legal 
future of darknet-technologies is less certain, but we believe that, at least for some classes 
of user, and possibly for the population at large, efficient darknets will exist. The rest of this 
section will analyze the implications of the darknet from the point of view of individual 
technologies and of commerce in digital goods. 
 5.1 Technological Implications 
DRM systems are limited to protecting the content they contain. Beyond our first 
assumption about the darknet, the darknet is not impacted by DRM systems. In light of our 
first assumption about the darknet, DRM design details, such as properties of the tamper-
resistant software may be strictly less relevant than the question whether the current 
darknet has a global database. In the presence of an infinitely efficient darknet ￿ which 
allows instantaneous transmission of objects to all interested users ￿ even sophisticated 
DRM systems are inherently ineffective. On the other hand, if the darknet is made up of 
isolated small worlds, even BOBE-weak DRM systems are highly effective. The interesting 
cases arise between these two extremes ￿ in the presence of a darknet, which is 
connected, but in which factors, such as latency, limited bandwidth or the absence of a 
global database limit the speed with which objects propagate through the darknet. It 
appears that quantitative studies of the effective ￿diffusion constant￿ of different kinds of 
darknets would be highly useful in elucidating the dynamics of DRM and the darknet. 
Proposals for systems involving mandatory watermark detection in rendering devices 
try to impact the effectiveness of the darknet directly by trying to detect and eliminate 
objects that originated in the darknet. In addition to severe commercial and social 
problems, these schemes suffer from several technical deficiencies, which, in the 
presence of an effective darknet, lead to their complete collapse. We conclude that such 
schemes are doomed to failure. 
 
5.2 Business in the Face of the Darknet 
There is evidence that the darknet will continue to exist and provide low cost, high-
quality service to a large group of consumers. This means that in many markets, the 
darknet will be a competitor to legal commerce.  From the point of view of economic 
theory, this has profound implications for business strategy: for example, increased 
security (e.g. stronger DRM systems) may act as a disincentive to legal commerce.   
Consider an MP3 file sold on a web site: this costs money, but the purchased object is as 
useful as a version acquired from the darknet.  However, a securely DRM-wrapped song is 
strictly  less attractive: although the industry is striving for flexible licensing rules, 
customers will be restricted in their actions if the system is to provide meaningful security.  
This means that a vendor will probably make more money by selling unprotected objects 
than protected objects.  In short, if you are competing with the darknet, you must compete 
on the darknet￿s own terms: that is convenience and low cost rather than additional 
security. 
Certain industries have faced this (to a greater or lesser extent) in the past.  Dongle-
protected computer programs lost sales to unprotected programs, or hacked versions of 
the program.  Users have also refused to upgrade to newer software versions that are 
copy protected.   
There are many factors that influence the threat of the darknet to an industry.  We see 
the darknet having most direct bearing on mass-market consumer IP-goods.  Goods sold 
to corporations are less threatened because corporations mostly try to stay legal, and will 
police their own intranets for illicit activities.  Additionally, the cost-per-bit, and the total size 
of the objects have a huge bearing on the competitiveness of today￿s darknets compared 
with legal trade.  For example, today￿s peer-to-peer technologies provide excellent service 
quality for audio files, but users must be very determined or price-sensitive to download 
movies from a darknet, when the legal competition is a rental for a few dollars.   References 
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